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difficult task, or was it more an accident of co-terminosity? The anti-psychiatrists who adopted his
themes, the "Great Confinement" and so forth, happened to be in the ascendant at the time (the early
1960s) and embraced his anti-institutional analysis with perfervid zeal despite the confusions
engendered in both directions. There seems to have been little acknowledgement either that
asylumdom was, in itself, the necessary precursor to current critiques, given that the putting of mad
people into the "bricks and mortar" solution was an eventuality that was always going to be tried out
by someone, at some time, once economically and architecturally possible. There is also no
contribution here from a professional psychiatrist, although Colin Gordon decides that a suggestion
from Peter Barham (a psychologist) is "typical evidence" of the psychiatric profession's
"intellectual insecurity and its propensity to moral blackmail". This may be true, but to equate
psychiatrists with psychologists, particularly in the field of anti-psychiatric social history, is, to say
the least, thoughtless. This is a kind of "easy wandering lie", that perhaps points to the existence of
someone whose mind might "easily be a wandering one".
Perhaps psychiatrists, rather than historians or sociologists or related academics, will profit most
from this oddly stimulating collection. It provides a useful introduction, warts and all, to modern
historiography and the forms of socio-historical analysis now enriching their past. It reveals the
danger of attempting to translate ideas (let alone "discourses") across time, culture, and language.
Thus, should we translate the French "deraison" as "unreason"? What about "dysreason", since
something untried seems in order? Is there any satisfactory word at all? Should we go on arguing
about Michel Foucault, or should he be decently interred with the historical plate and armour of his
time? Is clarity of expression honourable, or is that just the impossible objective of the dull old
English empiric? Some will welcome the spectre of"endless rewriting" generated by such questions.
Others will wish to close the book, glad to have done the reading, but glad to be back in open
country, clear of the foliage.
Trevor Turner, St Bartholomew's Hospital, London
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This book is directed at two disparate audiences: historians of genetics, who will be interested in
the detailed information it provides on the German genetics community, and sociologists ofscience,
who will be interested in its wider message. I suspect that it will establish itselfas a reference text for
both constituencies and I also believe its conclusions to be deeply flawed.
Harwood has two major theses. The first is that German and American geneticists had different
research agenda which in turn reflected different national styles: German breadth versus American
specialization. The second is that within Germany research agenda were determined by class and
education: "educated" middle-class breadth versus "industrial, commercial or lower" middle-class
pragmatism. What both theses have in common is Harwood's distinction between broad and narrow
research agenda. Transmission genetics and cytogenetics count as narrow (or pragmatic);
evolutionary and developmental genetics as broad.
My problems start when Harwood assigns these research agenda to different social and national
styles, and the reason is that the agenda were largely sequential. Thus the two German schools which
Harwood takes as his prototypes for broad and narrow agenda were established at quite different
periods: Erwin Baur (his transmission geneticist) was running his first genetics course in 1905;
Alfred Kuhn (his developmental geneticist) did not enter genetics until 1920. By then the problems
of the day had changed, as various German quotes affirm. And although Baur was the son of a
pharmacist while Kuhn was the son of a doctor, and Baur apparently gardened while Kuhn read
Goethe, I am not persuaded that these were the factors which determined the differences in their
research agenda-particularly when counter-examples are scattered throughout the text.
These counter-examples fall into two categories: individuals who do not fit (but then there are
exceptions to every rule), and those who change their research agenda (but not presumably their
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formative educational and social background) with time. Thus Richard Goldschmidt, who was head
ofthe department ofgenetics at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology until he was thrown out of
Germany in the thirties, started as a powerful and enthusiastic supporter oftransmission genetics and
only later moved into physiological genetics. Hans Nachtsheim, Baur's assistant at the Berlin
Agricultural College, initially worked on transmission genetics and later pioneered the
developmental genetics of the rabbit. Even Baur took an interest in evolution; although his
premature death in 1933 (so sudden that it was rumoured to be murder) prevents us from following
his later career. (This episode shows Harwood at his best, recounting for non-German readers Baur's
battle with the Minister of Agriculture as the National Socialists remorsely eroded academic
autonomy.)
How about national styles then, a thesis which Harwood has been arguing for some time? To my
mindexactly the same problem arises. Harwood's American prototype is the school ofThomas Hunt
Morgan, which transformed transmission genetics between 1910 and 1915. They too moved on to
"broader" questions, but this later research is almost completely ignored. "In view ofthe grounds on
which Morgan et al. declined to work on evolutionary or developmental genetics. . .", Harwood
states blandly, and my jaw simply drops.
How can he so misread the interests of the Morgan group after 1918? I think there are several
reasons. One is that Morgan's ex cathedra pronouncements were often at variance with the research
his laboratory was actually carrying out. Another is that the success of Morgan's transmission
genetics probably obscured the research programmes which carried less immediate rewards. (And of
course the gene mapping continued: the programmes were not mutually exclusive.) Both these
factors probably influenced the contemporary German perception ofthe Morgan school (the starting
point for Harwood's thesis) although in the case ofGoldschmidt it is clear that Morgan's dismissal
of Goldschmidt's own theory of development was also a factor. (American developmental
geneticists such as Leslie Dunn were well aware of the wider interests of the Morgan school.)
But the main reason for Harwood's failure to acknowledge the later work must be that for
America he is relying on the secondary history ofgenetics literature, which has concentrated heavily
on the early history of the Morgan group. This also undermines any direct comparison with
Germany, where Harwood's sample population is drawn from his survey of the German primary
literature. Ifhistorians want to start drawing sociological conclusions then they should take on board
the basic principle ofstatistical analysis which is that valid comparisons can be made only when like
is compared with like. This means populations sampled at the same time point and populations
identified using the same criteria: neither ofthese conditions is met here and the result (as Harwood
himself points out) is that he is comparing fish with fowl.
This is a pity since the comparison between other statistical populations (the membership of the
German Genetics Society and the Genetics Society of America for example) provides some
fascinating insights. Who would have thought that in 1930 only 8 per cent of the American
membership worked in genetics departments? Orthatthe membershipoftheGerman society in 1929
was over 20 per cent larger than its American equivalent in 1933? Taken together these statistics
must undermine any simple correlation between the growth ofadiscipline and its academic structure
and it seems to me that they form an interesting starting point for further investigation.
Finally, I have to say that Harwood has been ill-served by his indexer. To give but one example,
two of the major German geneticists listed in Table 4.1 never make it to the index at all.
Guil Winchester, Wellcome Institute
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